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ESSAY

TAKING STOCK OF THE TAKINGS DEBATE
Lois J. Schiffer*
Until recently, the Environment and Natural Resources
Division ("ENRD" or "Division") at the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ" or "Justice Department) was
known as the Land and Natural Resources Division. Old
habits die hard, for many of the old-time veterans at the Justice Department still refer to the ENRD as the "Lands" Division. While most of the ENRD's lawyers are primarily environmental lawyers, vexing issues of property law continue to
present themselves to the Division on a daily basis.
As a takings litigator, I would like to add my voice to the
current debate on takings issues. This essay addresses two
related topics. First, I will describe the DOJ's takings docket
before the United States Court of Federal Claims.! Second, I
will share my thoughts on the so-called "takings bills" being
considered by the U.S. Congress, particularly the bills that
would impose sweeping new compensation mandates.!
I. OVERVIEW OF THE TAKINGS DOCKET
Before turning to our inverse condemnation cases, it
should be noted that the overwhelming majority of property
acquisitions by the federal government occur either by voluntary acquisition or direct condemnation-in other words,
without any dispute at all over whether a taking has occurred. The Justice Department currently has more than
* Lois J. Schiffer is the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Environment and Natural Resources Division ("ENRD") of the U.S. Department of
Justice. Timothy J. Dowling, an attorney in ENRD's Policy, Legislation & Special Litigation Section, assisted in the preparation of these remarks. This essay
derives from a speech Assistant Attorney General Schiffer delivered on June 5,
1997 in Washington, D.C. at the Association of American Law Schools' Conference on Property.
1. See infra Part I.
2. See infra Part II.
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4000 condemnation matters pending in the ENRD's Land
Acquisition Section, and it recently calculated that the total
estimated compensation for these condemnations was more
than $360 million.3 Certain participants in the takings debate contend that the government routinely disregards its
constitutional obligation to pay just compensation when it
takes private property. But in reality, in the vast majority of
cases, the issue of whether there has been a taking simply
does not arise. The ENRD acknowledges the need for the
taking, and compensates for it. These acquisitions include
not only fee simple acquisitions for new federal buildings, but
also the purchase of a wide variety of other property interests
including flood and flowage easements, scenic easements,
and buffer zone easements for military installations.
The takings cases that generate the most controversy are
not the eminent domain cases, but the inverse condemnation
cases. 4 The Division's inverse condemnation practice has
traditionally consisted of cases that involve the physical occupation or invasion of property. For example, there are the
overflight cases, which date back to the 1946 Supreme Court
decision, United States v. Causby.5 The Causby Court made
clear that the inconveniences caused by government aircraft
are normally not compensable under the Takings Clause of
Fifth Amendment,6 but it held that a taking may occur where
flights over private land are "so low and frequent as to be a
direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and
use of the land."7
The physical invasion cases under review at the ENRD
also include flooding and flowage easement cases, which date
back to the early 1900's. A taking may occur where flooding
is the natural and probable consequence of authorized gov3. These and other statistics cited in this article regarding the Justice Department's takings docket were compiled by Assistant Attorney General Schiffer from the litigation files and computer databases located at the U.S. Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division,
Washington, D.C.
4. Inverse condemnation is the name given to a cause of action against a
governmental agency to recover the value of property which has been taken in
fact by the governmental agency, even though there has been no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 8.1 (1977).

5. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. Causby, 328 U.S. at 266.
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ernment action and is inevitably recurring.8
The ENRD also litigates tenancy "holdover" cases. These
cases involve situations in which the federal government continues to occupy property after a lease expires. The court determines the just compensation due for the "holdover" period.
If you consider how much of the takings debate focuses
on federal regulation that merely restricts the use of property-such as wetlands regulation-it may come as a surprise to learn that well more than a third of the Environment
Division's inverse condemnation portfolio consists of physical-invasion takings cases.
This section of the essay summarizes the Division's cases
that involve only a restriction on land use, without any
physical invasion ("reg-take" cases). At the close of fiscal
year 1997, the ENRD had about 180 such cases on its docket.
Over the past three or four years, this number has remained
relatively stable, and the current mix of cases is generally
representative of the Division's reg-take docket. The largest
category-roughly a quarter of the reg-take docket-involves
the permit program under section 404 of the Clean Water
Act 9 and related protections under section 10 of the Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899.10 Permits issued under section 404 authorize discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States, including wetlands.1 1
The ENRD currently has approximately forty-six regtake cases arising out of permit denials or other actions under the section 404 program. It is important to keep these
claims in perspective, and to view them in the context of the
number of regulatory decisions made each year under the
section 404 program. In fiscal year 1996, the Army Corps of
Engineers reports that more than 64,000 landowners asked
the Corps for a section 404 permit. 2 More than eighty-five
percent of the applicants received authorization under a general permit in an average time of just fourteen days. 3 Only
8. E.g., United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917).
9. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
10. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994).
11. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
12. HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property
and Nuclear Safety of the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 105th Cong.
1-2 (1997) (statement of Michael L. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Army, Civil Works).
13. Id.
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219-less than one-half of one percent-of the applications
were denied.'4 In other words, only a tiny fraction of agency
actions under the wetlands protection program generate the
cases that comprise our regulatory takings docket.
Claims alleging a regulatory denial of access to land constitute the next largest category. For example, a holder of a
mineral interest in government land might seek just compensation for a temporary taking if the government disputes the
validity of the claim and temporarily denies access to the
land. The Division is currently litigating about thirty-four
takings cases based on regulatory denial of access.
The ENRD has about twenty-two inverse condemnation
cases under the "Superfund" cleanup program. 5 Certain
property owners have claimed that government-compelled
monitoring wells and other cleanup activities affecting their
property entitle them to just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment.
The fourth largest category of reg-take cases involves
allegations of takings of oil, gas, and mineral interests, such
as those arising under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act. 6 Approximately fifteen such cases are pending in this
area.
The ENRD has about twelve reg-take claims based on
alleged breach of contract. For example, the claimant might
argue that an alleged breach of a timber contract by the
United States Forest Service constitutes a taking of property.
Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs in these cases often assert a
breach of contract claim as well.
Surface mining regulation has spawned about five cases
on our current regulatory takings docket. A decision that
certain property is unsuitable for surface mining, the prohibitions against surface mining in protected areas, or government entry on property to abate the adverse effects of past
surface mining might give rise to such cases.
The ENRD is currently litigating another four regulatory
takings cases under the "rails-to-trails" program. The Na-

14.
15.
ability
16.
17.
18.

Id.
See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and LiAct of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56 (1994).
Id.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
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tional Trails Systems Act, 9 authorizes the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") to approve interim use of railroad
rights-of-way as trails where a qualified person takes responsibility for the trail operation. When the railroad's interest
in the right-of-way is conditioned on continued use for railroad purposes, these ICC approvals might give rise to claims
that they have taken the reversionary interest in the right-ofway.
There are an additional four pending reg-take cases that
involve protections for endangered species or other wildlife.
The remaining cases involve various situations where
the landowner alleges that regulatory activity has encroached on the use or enjoyment of her property. For example, the Division faces takings challenges to what might be
called federal "land-use" regulatory programs, such as legislation designed to preserve the Columbia River Basin Gorge.
These figures are constantly changing and they are,
therefore, necessarily approximations. But they should give
the reader a sense of the relative numbers within the major
categories of cases on the ENRD's regulatory takings docket.
It should be noted that the Justice Department's Civil Division litigates additional takings cases where the property interest does not concern land.

II. TAKINGS LEGISLATION
This section of the essay addresses the so-called takings
bills, focusing on three topics. First, I will describe what the
Clinton Administration is doing to address the legitimate
concerns of property owners. Second, I will explain why the
pending takings bills are fundamentally flawed. Finally, I
will briefly respond to some of the so-called "horror stories"
that have dominated the takings debate.
A.

Clinton Administration Reforms

The Clinton Administration has clearly demonstrated its
strong support for the protection of private property rights.
Where government regulations impose unreasonable burdens
on private property, this Administration is committed to reforming those rules to make them more fair and flexible. ° In
19. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-51 (1994).
20. The Right to Own Property: Hearings on S. 605 Before the Senate
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the following description of these initiatives, please note that
certain reforms are being challenged in court.
Recent initiatives in the wetlands program2 will give
landowners much welcomed flexibility.22 Under a regulation
that establishes a new general permit, landowners will be
allowed to affect up to one-half acre of non-tidal wetlands to
build or expand a single-family home and related features
such as a garage or driveway, without having to go through
the individual permit process.2 The Administration has also
moved to expedite the approval process for wetlands mitigation banking, which will allow more development projects to
go forward more quickly.24 In addition, the Army Corps of
Engineers is reforming the wetlands program to make the
permit application process quicker and easier for everybody.2 5
At the United States Department of the Interior, Secretary Bruce Babbitt is implementing landmark reforms under
the Endangered Species Act of 197326 to address landowner
concerns. 27 Under one new proposal, low-impact activities
that affect five acres or less will be presumed to have only a
negligible adverse effect on threatened species.28 Under another initiative called the "No Surprises" Policy, property
owners who agree to help protect endangered species on their
property are assured that their obligations will not change,

Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, 48 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 605] (prepared statement of John R. Schmidt, Associate Attorney
General, U.S. Department of Justice).
21. The wetlands permit program is jointly administered by the Army
Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. See generally, WILLIAM M. TABB & LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 551-94
(1992) (materials on wetlands regulation).
22. Private Property Rights and Environmental Laws: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 104th Cong., 153-55, 187-89 (1995)
[hereinafter Senate EPW Hearings] (testimony of Michael L. Davis, Assistant
for Regulatory Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Civil
Works).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994).
27. Hearings on S. 605, supra note 20, at 181-85 (statement of Joseph L.
Sax, Counselor to the Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Appendix: "Status
of Department of the Interior's Reform of the ESA").
28. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Rule Exempting Certain Small Landowners and Low-Impact Activities from Endangered Species Act Requirements for Threatened Species, 60 Fed. Reg. 37,419
(1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 17) (proposed July 20, 1995).
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even if the needs of the species change over time. 9 Furthermore, other new "safe harbor" policies protect landowners
from additional land use restrictions where the owner voluntarily enhances wildlife habitat.
Proponents of statutory compensation mandates argue
that they are necessary because it is difficult and timeconsuming to litigate a takings claim in federal court. 3' Attorneys at the DOJ are keenly aware of the need to assure
that all Americans can seek redress through the courts for
meritorious claims. A property owner who successfully litigates a takings claim in the Court of Federal Claims is entitled to recover attorneys fees, litigation costs, and interest
from the date of the taking, a powerful aid to vindicating
meritorious claims.32 The DOJ is committed to working with
the courts to ensure that takings claims may be resolved
quickly and efficiently, including, for example, the use of alternative dispute resolution techniques where appropriate.
B.

The Basic Defects of Takings Compensation Legislation

Of course, every citizen should be protected from unreasonable regulatory restrictions on property. But compensation bills are exactly the wrong way to go.
There were three such bills that were the focal point of
the takings debate in the 104th Congress.33 The Housepassed bill was the Private Property Protection Act of 1995."4
It would have applied to protections under the Endangered
Species Act of 1973"5 and section 404 of the Clean Water
Act,36 as well as to federal reclamation or land use laws that

29. Hearings on S. 605, supra note 20, at 182 (statement of Joseph L. Sax,
Counselor to the Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Appendix: "Status of
Department of the Interior's Reform of the ESA").
30. Id. (statement of Joseph L. Sax, Counselor to the Secretary, U.S. Dep't
of the Interior, Appendix: "Status of Department of the Interior's Reform of the
ESA").
31. Id. at 62-63 (prepared statement of Nancie Marzulla, President and
Chief Legal Counsel, Defenders of Property Rights).
32. See Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1994).
33. H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995); S.605, 104th Cong. (1995); S.1954, 104th
Cong. (1996).
34. H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995).
35. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
36. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
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affect water rights.3 7 The Private Property Protection Act
would have required compensation where federal action reduces the value of any portion of private property by 20%. 8
The other main takings bills in the 104th Congress were
the Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995"s ("Omnibus Act")
and its 1996 successor, 4 both of which were far broader in
scope. These compensation mandates were not limited to
specific programs, but instead applied to federal actions
across the board.4' The Omnibus Act contained a 33% lossin-value compensation threshold. 2 The 1996 successor to the
Omnibus Act had a 50% trigger, was limited to real property
interests, and contained exceptions for civil rights protections.4 ' In May 1997, Senator Hatch introduced a new omnibus takings bill. The 1997 bill is limited to real property interests and contains an exception for civil rights protections,
but it resurrects the 33% loss-in-value compensation mandate from the original Omnibus Act.45
Most significantly, all of these bills reduce the compensability inquiry to a single factor: loss in value of the affected
portion of the property. These bills would create a rigid,
"one-size-fits-all" approach that precludes consideration of
factors normally considered by the courts under the Constitution, and that are critical to assessing the overall fairness
of the situation. In Concrete Pipe & Products of California,
Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern
California," every member of the Supreme Court joined an
opinion stating that loss in property value, by itself, is insufficient to demonstrate a compensable taking. 7 This long
standing constitutional principle recognizes that other factors must be considered in deciding whether compensation
would be fair and just, such as: (1) the landowner's legitimate expectations, (2) the extent to which the claimant has

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995).
Id.
S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995).
S. 1954, 104th Cong. (1996).
See S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 1954, 104th Cong. (1996).
See S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995).
See S. 1954, 104th Cong. (1996).
S. 781, 106th Cong. (1997).
Id.
508 U.S. 602 (1993).
Id. at 645.
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benefited from government action, and (3) the effect of the
proposed land use on neighboring landowners and the public.48 Because compensation bills basically preclude consideration of these factors, they would necessarily result in unjustified windfalls at the taxpayers' expense.
The compensation bills are further flawed because the
loss-in-value trigger focuses solely on the affected portion of
the property. The courts have made clear that under the
Constitution, fairness and justice require an examination of
the regulation's impact on the parcel as a whole.49 Under
takings bills, however, if a single government action enhances the value of most of the property, but reduces the
value of a small portion, compensation would be required.
These radical compensation schemes would force all of us
to decide between two equally unacceptable alternatives.
The first option would be to cut back on the protection of human health, the environment, worker safety, and other values that give us the high quality of life Americans have come
to expect. The other option would be to do what these proposals require: pay corporations to ensure the safety of their
workers, pay manufacturers not to dump their waste into the
streams that run through our neighborhoods, and so forth.
Basically, American taxpayers would be forced to pay corporations and other landowners for simply following the law.
In 1995, the Office of Management and Budget estimated
that the House bill would cost $28 billion through the year
2002.50 This estimate does not include the substantial costs
of administering a compensation claims program, or the costs
of managing the patchwork quilt of property parcels that the
federal government would be forced to acquire." The compensation scheme in the Senate bills is far broader in scope,
and would cost several times the $28 billion cost of the
House-passed legislation. 2
Bill proponents sometimes argue that individual landowners are unfairly shouldering these costs now. 3 However,
48. Id. at 643-44.
49. See id.
50. Senate EPW Hearings, supra note 22, at 134-46, 181-83 (testimony of
Alice Rivlin, Director, Office of Management and Budget).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Hearings on S. 605, supra note 20 (prepared statement of Jonathan
Adler, Competitive Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.)
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this simply is not true. The potential costs of these bills are
so high because they would require compensation in many
cases where compensation would be unfair and unjust, for
example: where the landowner had no reasonable expectation to use the land in the manner proposed, where land-use
regulation benefits the property as a whole, or where other
uses would yield a reasonable return on investment without
harming neighboring landowners or the public. If the government takes ten actions, nine which enhance land value,
and one which reduces value, then these bills would require
compensation. Fairness goes right out the window.
Both the Omnibus Act and the Private Property Protection Act purport to address health and safety concerns by
providing an exception to the compensation requirement
where the property use at issue would constitute a nuisance
under applicable State law.54 However, the Congress generally provides for federal protection of human health, public
safety, the environment, and other important interests only
where State law is inadequate to the task. Furthermore,
State nuisance law is often unable to provide comprehensive
protection for human heath and the environment. 5 Thus, the
narrow nuisance exception set forth in these bills is little
more than a ruse; it is basically meaningless."
C.

The "HorrorStories"

One may ask, if takings bills are so obviously flawed,
why are they being considered? Much of the debate has been
driven by anecdotal evidence, the so-called "horror stories,"
stories of people who have supposedly been victimized by
overzealous regulators. A closer evaluation of these horror
stories reveals that they taint the ability of lawmakers to
make sound policy decisions.
One so-called victim of Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") regulators is John Pozsgai-convicted of forty counts
54. S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995).
55. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Takings Legislation: Where It Stands and
What Is Next, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 509, 512-13 (1996) (discussing that many polluting activities under laws of many states are not considered nuisances).
56. See Hearings on S. 605, supra note 20, at 65 (prepared statement of
John R. Schmidt, Associate Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice);
Senate EPW Hearings, supra note 22, at 81-87 (statement of Joseph L. Sax,
Counselor to the Secretary, Department of the Interior, Appendix: "Memo on
the Nuisance Exceptions in H.R. 925 and S. 605").
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of violating the Clean Water Act after he illegally filled wetSupporters of takings bills frelands on his property."
quently attempt to portray Pozsgai as both a victim and a
hero. Yet, you will not hear from these supporters that Pozsgai knew he needed a permit to fill the property when he
purchased it.58 He even negotiated a drop in his purchase
price due to the wetlands protections that applied to the
land.59 Pozsgai then ignored repeated warnings from the
EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers to stop filling the
wetlands without a permit. 6' He likewise violated a temporary restraining order issued by a federal district court which
prohibited further violations. 1 His neighborg' property was
damaged by flooding after he illegally filled the wetlands,
which normally serve to absorb excess storm water.62 According to one source, at Pozsgai's sentencing proceeding, the
court said: "It is] hard to visualize a more stubborn violator
of the laws that were designed to protect the environment .... ,,8 "If everyone followed Mr. Pozsgai's example and
placed his or her interests above the laws duly enacted by
Congress we would live in an anarchy, not a democracy governed by law."64 Thus, John Pozsgai is no hero.
Other property rights advocates trumpeted the case of
John Chaconas, who owns a home built on wetlands in Louisiana.6 5 They sought to portray him and the previous owner
of the land as victims of the EPA because the Agency notified
them that the wetlands on the property had been filled illegally.66 Much to the surprise and chagrin of supporters of
takings bills, however, when Mr. Chaconas testified before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, he stated, "I have been por57. United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 721 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1110 (1994);
58. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 722; Richard B. Stewart, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Letter to the Editor, Wetlands: Owner Rights v.
Rights of Us All, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1990, at A15; Man Sentenced to Jail for
Dumping on Wetlands, HARRISBURG (PA) PATRIOT & EVENING NEWS, July 14,
1989, at B3.
59. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 722.
60. Id. at 723.
61. Id.
62. Stewart, supra note 58 at A15.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Hearings on S. 605, supra note 20, at 96 (prepared statement of John J.
Chaconas).
66. Id.
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trayed as the victim of an unfair law and overzealous bureaucrats. I want to set the record straight. We ...have become victims of larger interests pursuing their agenda to
dismantle wetlands policy through takings legislation." 67 He
testified that when he bought the property in 1993, it appeared to be high, dry, flat land, perfect for a home for his
family and a pasture for his horses.6" Due to the violations of
wetlands protections, he said he cannot walk ten feet out his
front door without being ankle deep in water and heavy clay
mud. 9 He also stated that frogs stream in the front door
when it opens, and water moccasins swim outside his bedroom window.7 ' He testified that he is dismayed by takings
bills that would require taxpayers to compensate people simply for complying with the wetlands law, the violation of
which has caused him endless misery.7
III. CONCLUSION

Like the horror stories that drive the debate, there is
something downright deceptive about these compensation
bills. The special-interest groups that support these bills
have dressed them up in property-rights rhetoric, even
though they would hurt most property owners. They say
these bills would protect constitutional rights, even though
they would replace two centuries of constitutional law. That
is not good government. In order to improve laws concerning
Takings Clause issues, there needs to be more pub'lic debate
on the merits of various proposals so the public can make fair
assessments to guide their choices. That is what sound public policymaking and good lawyering are all about.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 96-97.

COMMENTS

CROSSING THE PICKET LINE IN SUPPORT OF
THE UNION: THE NEW FLAVOR OF SALTING

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, organized labor has witnessed a significant drop in membership.! In 1995, 15% of American wage
and salary workers belonged to unions, compared to a high of
33% in 1953.2

In the private sector, the numbers are even

more dramatic with union membership dropping from 36% in
1953 to 10% in 1995.' However, this is not the first time labor has been confronted with low numbers.4 During the
1920's, union membership dropped as low as 12%.' It remains to be seen if unions can once again mount a comeback.
More aggressive union techniques support the notion
that a resurgence is in the near future, if not already in progress.6 For example, in 1997, the American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations7 ("AFL-CIO") in1. See Justin Fox, Big Labor Flexes Its Muscles, FORTUNE, June 10, 1996,
at 24.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.

6. See James Worsham, Labor Comes Alive, NATION'S BuS., Feb. 1996, at
16. John J. Sweeney, the president of the American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations, anticipates a "much stronger labor movement
in the year 2000. Stronger in voice, stronger in membership, stronger in perception." Id. "Business has had it soft and easy for 15 years under Reagan and
Bush, and they think labor is a whipped puppy dog. Labor's going to surprise
them," declared Vic Kamber, a Washington consultant whose firm represents
18 labor unions. Id. at 24.
7. See generally ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW 8-83 (12th ed. 1996).

The American Federation of Labor ("AFL") was formed in 1886 by Samuel
Gompers in order to increase worker's economic bargaining power. Id. at 10.
During the early 1930's, the AFL was challenged by those seeking to unionize
the mass production industries, resulting in the creation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations ("CIO"). Id. at 82. "While the aims of the AFL were influenced by its tendency to favor the skilled workers, the CIO was primarily a
movement of the unskilled workers." Id. at 83. However, in 1955, the two unions were able to reconcile their differences and merged into the present AFLCIO. Id.
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creased its annual budget for organizing unions from $2.5
million to $30 million.8 Additionally, organized labor contributed millions to the re-election campaign of President
Clinton, which has prompted some to speculate that labor
will be looking for legislative and regulatory paybacks.' Furthermore, the AFL-CIO has implemented less traditional
programs such as "Union Summer," an event that sent 1,600
college aged men and women across the country to assist in
everything from picketing to voter registration as a means of
resurgence." Recent research suggests that new and innovative methods, such as Union Summer, may be the key to union success in the future."
In 1995, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
creative union-organizing technique of having paid union organizers obtain employment with non-union businesses with
the intent to form a union, a tactic known as "salting."'2 This
technique was a response to a 1992 Supreme Court decision
which severely restricted the union's ability to distribute information to employees they wished to organize while on
company property." By becoming "employees" as defined by
the National Labor Relations Act 4 ("NLRA"), union organiz8. See James Worsham, Labor's New Assault, NATION'S Bus., June 1997,
at 17.
9. See Stuart Silverstein, 1996-1997: Review and Outlook, L.A. TIMES,

Dec. 29, 1996, at D2.
10. See Diane E. Lewis, Labor '96:

Unions Look to the Young, BOSTON

GLOBE, Sept. 2, 1996, at Al.
11. See John T. Delaney et al., Planningfor Change: Determinants of Innovation in U.S. National Unions, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 597, 598 (1996)

("Although increased innovation does not ensure greater union effectiveness,
the fate of American unions may depend more on identifying new practices to
cope with the environment of the 1990's than on perfecting old methods.").
12. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450 (1995)
(forthcoming reporter publication at 516 U.S. 85 (1995)).
13. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 541 (1992). An employer
may prohibit distribution and solicitation by non-employee union organizers
anywhere on company property, so long as the union has "reasonable access to
employees outside an employer's property." Id.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1994). The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") is a

federal statute that regulates the relations between unions, employers and employees. See generally COX ET AL., supra note 7, at 74-112. It also established
the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), an administrative agency re-

sponsible for preventing and remedying violations and administering representation provisions of the NLRA. Id. at 100.
Section 152(3) of the NLRA provides that:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly

states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has
ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor
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ers gained protection to distribute pro-union solicitation on
company property during their non-working time. 5
There remain, however, areas in the law where unions
are at a significant disadvantage and are in need of innovative techniques.16 One such area lies in an employer's ability
to permanently replace striking employees. 17 In NLRB v.
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.," 8 the Supreme Court held

that employers are not required to discharge replacement
workers hired during a strike once the strike is over, or to
otherwise create jobs for returning economic 9 strikers." In
other words, while the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice" for employers to discipline or discharge employees for
dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994).
15. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S.Ct. 450 (1995); see also
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Our Way, Inc., 268
N.L.R.B. 394 (1984); Witchcraft Houseboat Div., 195 N.L.R.B. 1046 (1972).
16. For example, an employer is permitted to give anti-union speeches to
employees on company time and property, even though the employer may refuse to give the union an equal opportunity to reply on company property during
work hours. See NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am., 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
17. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
18. Id.
19. Workers who strike in an effort to receive increased economic benefits
are considered "economic strikers." Id. Those that strike as a result of an employer's violation of the NLRA are classified as "unfair labor practice strikers."
See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 292 (1956).
20. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. at 333. Unlike economic strikers,
unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to reinstatement during or after a
strike, even if it requires the discharge of replacement workers. See Mastro
Plastics Corp., 350 U.S. at 270.
21. Black's Law Dictionary defines an unfair labor practice as:
Within National Labor Relations Act, it is an unfair labor practice for
an employer: (1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of their rights to self organization, to form, join or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. (2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of a labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it. (3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization. (4) To discharge or otherwise discriminate
against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony
under the Act. (5) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1529 (6th ed. 1990).
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engaging in a strike, at the same time, it allows for permanent replacement of them.22
Lawmakers have attempted to change the law in order to
reverse the Mackay holding.2" In 1991, the House of Representatives passed the Workplace Fairness Act,24 which would
have amended the NLRA to prohibit hiring permanent replacements in the majority of strike situations.2" The attempt, however, proved unsuccessful.2 6 In July 1994, the
Senate version27 was dropped in light of a threatened filibuster. 8 Finally, in November 1994, the House and Senate removed the Workplace Fairness Act from the congressional
agenda. 9
After the bills failed to pass, President Clinton issued an
Executive Order prohibiting the federal government from
contracting with an employer who hires permanent replacements during a lawful strike. 0 Consequently, the Order was
challenged in Chamber of Commerce v. Reich,"' where the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals struck down
the Order, holding that "the Executive Order is regulatory in
nature and is preempted by the NLRA which guarantees the
right to hire permanent replacements."3 2 Thus, employers
may still permanently replace striking workers.
Recently, a union attempted to combat Mackay by using
the newly validated tactic of salting in the strike context.3
Specifically, union activists crossed the picket line and returned to work "for the announced purposes of campaigning
for the union among replacement workers and monitoring
the employer's conduct." 4 The employer was confronted with
the difficult choice between taking the employees back un-

22. See NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
23. See COX ET AL., supra note 7, at 531.
24. H.R. 5, 103d Cong. (1993).
25. See COX ET AL., supra note 7, at 531.
26. Id. at 532.
27. S. 55, 103d Cong. (1993).
28. See COX ET AL., supra note 7, at 532.
29. Id.
30. See Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023 (1995). President Clinton issued the Order pursuant to his authority under the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act, 40 U.S.C. § 471 et. seq. (1994). Exec. Order No.
12,954, supra.
31. 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
32. Id. at 1339.
33. See Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut II), 113
F.3d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc).
34. Id. at 1282 (Henderson, J., concurring and dissenting).
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conditionally, with the potential threat of sabotage and violent confrontations with replacement workers, and placing
conditions on the terms of employment, with the possibility
that the employees would bring an unfair labor practice
charge for discriminating against them due to union membership. 5
This comment provides an analysis of a union's tactic of
having activists cross the picket line in order to campaign for
the union-salting. Section II provides an overview of the
employer's obligation towards returning economic strikers.36
This section also outlines two recent Supreme Court decisions pertaining to labor law.37 Additionally, the facts of
Diamond Walnut v. NLRB,"5 a case where union activists
crossed the picket line during a strike, are detailed.3 9 Section
III illustrates the unanswered questions left by the Diamond
Walnut decision.4" Section IV analyzes the relevance of the
Supreme Court's recent decisions to the facts presented in
Diamond Walnut.4' Finally, Section V proposes the need to
follow the principles established by the Supreme Court,4 as
well as the need to improve the tactic used in Diamond Walnut.43

35. See Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut II), 113
F.3d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc). Section 7 of the NLRA grants employees
the "right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). Section 8(a)(1) makes
it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [ 17." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994). Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to "encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994).
Section 158(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994).
36. See discussion infra Part II.A.
37. See discussion infra Parts II.B.2., II.C.
38. See Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut II), 113
F.3d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc).
39. See discussion infra Part II.D.
40. See discussion infra Part III.
41. See discussion infra Part IV.
42. See discussion infra Part V.A.
43. See discussion infra Part V.B.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Employer's ObligationsTowards Returning
Economic Strikers
1. The Mackay Doctrine
In NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co.," the
United States Supreme Court held that while economic
strikers cannot be fired for striking against their employer,
they may be permanently replaced.45 Mackay was the result
of a strike called by members of Local No. 3 of the American
Radio Telegraphists against a San Francisco radio and telegraph company." In order to continue its operations during
the strike, the employer brought in eleven employees from offices in other cities,4 7 five of whom accepted permanent positions in San Francisco.48 Fearing the strike was going to fail,
a number of the striking employees offered to return to
work.49 While some employees were reinstated, five employees who were active in both the union and strike were not,5 °
resulting in an unfair labor practice charge being filed with
the NLRB.51 The Court held that employers are not required
to discharge replacement workers in order to create vacancies for those strikers who wish to return to work." However, returning strikers are entitled to non-discriminatory
review of their applications.5 3 Because the Macay strikers
did not get a non-discriminatory review of their applications,
the employer committed an unfair labor practice by refusing

44. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
45. Id. at 345-46.
46. Id. at 336.
47. Id. at 338.
48. Id. at 339.
49. Id. at 337.
50. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 339 (1938).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 345-46. "[I]t does not follow that an employer ... has lost the
right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by
strikers. And he is not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers ... in order to create places for them." Id. Commentators have criticized
this holding as illogical and unjust. See, e.g., Hal Keith Gillespie, The Mackay
Doctrine and the Myth of Business Necessity, 50 TEX. L. REV. 782 (1972); Karl
E. Kare, JudicialDeradicalizationof the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 301-302 (1978); Paul
Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contractand the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 387-391 (1984).
53. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 347 (1938).
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to rehire only those who were active in the union and strike.5 4
2. Employer Justificationof DiscriminatoryTreatment
In NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.," the Supreme
Court clarified its previous holdings5 6 to establish "several
principles of controlling importance"5 7 regarding when an
employer can justify discriminatory acts towards employees
based on union membership, thus avoiding an unfair labor
practice charge.58 In GreatDane, the employer refused to pay
accrued vacation benefits to strikers, but offered the same
pay to all non-strikers, prompting charges of section 8(a)(3)
and section 8(a)(1) violations.59 The issue presented was
"whether, in the absence of proof of an antiunion motivation,
and
an employer may be held to have violated section 8 6(a)(3)
Act." 0
Relations
Labor
National
the
of
8(a)(1)
section
In addressing the issue, the Court distinguished between
"inherently destructive" discrimination and "comparatively
slight" discrimination.6 1 Where the discrimination is inherently destructive of employees' rights, no proof of an antiunion motivation is required for the Board to find an unfair
labor practice, even if the conduct was motivated by business
concerns.62 Alternatively, if the discrimination is comparatively slight, "an antiunion motivation must be proved to sustain the charge if the employer has come forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifications for

54. Id.
[The employer] might have refused reinstatement on the ground of
skill or ability ....It might have resorted to any one of a number of
methods of determining which of its striking employees would have to
wait because five men had taken permanent positions during the
strike, but it is found that the.., action taken by respondent [the employer], was with the purpose to discriminate against those most active
in the union.
Id.
55. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
56. See, e.g., American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965);
NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S.
221 (1963).
57. Great Dane Trailers,Inc., 388 U.S. at 30.
58. Id. at 34.
59. Id. at 30 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)-(3) (1994)).
60. Id. at 27.
61. Id. at 34.
62. Id.
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the conduct."6 3 After deciding that the offer of vacation pay to
non-strikers was discriminatory, the court found it unnecessary to determine the degree to which employee rights were
affected since the employer offered no evidence of legitimate
and substantial business justifications for its actions. 4 Accordingly, the Court found the employer's action to constitute
violations of section 8(a)(3) and section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA."5
Soon after the Great Dane decision, the Court had an opportunity to apply the same rationale to the context of a
striking employee's right to reinstatement in NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.66 In Fleetwood, the employer refused to rehire six striking employees after the conclusion of the strike,
asserting that no jobs were available.67 However, two months
later, six new employees were hired for positions for which
the strikers were qualified, resulting in a complaint from the
union charging violations of section 8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(3)
of the NLRA.68 The Court held that a striker's right to reinstatement is not limited to job availability at the time of an
employee's offer to return.69 Instead, "the status of the
striker as an employee continues until he has obtained 'other
regular and substantially equivalent employment."'7 0 Accordingly, the failure to rehire the striking employees constituted discrimination amounting to an unfair labor practice
since "the employer [had] not shown 'legitimate and substantial business justifications"' for its decision.71
3. DistinguishingBetween Inherently Destructive and
ComparativelySlight Discrimination
Because the employers in both Great Dane and Fleetwood failed to demonstrate any business justifications for
their discriminatory treatment, the Supreme Court was not
in a position to distinguish between inherently destructive
and comparatively slight discrimination. 2 Courts have sub63. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967) (second emphasis added).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 35.
66. 389 U.S. 375, 377 (1967).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 381.
70. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)).
71. Id. at 380 (quoting Great Dane Trailers,Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967)).
72. See GreatDane Trailers,Inc., 388 U.S. at 34; Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389
U.S. at 377.
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sequently been required to make that distinction, and not
surprisingly, no clear or concise rule has evolved. However,
in InternationalBrotherhood of Boilermakers v. NLRB,73 the
court conducted a comprehensive review of cases which were
to
in order
inherently destructive
to be
found
"shed ... light"74 onto the "dimly lit 7 5 path between the two.76
The Boilermakers court first concluded that the Supreme
Court intended the phrases "inherently destructive" and
"comparatively slight" to "encompass the universe of employer actions that have any non-trivial, adverse effect on
Therefore, if the act is less than inheremployee rights."
ently destructive, it is to be categorized as comparatively
slight."5 Next, the court found that there existed two predominant factors for determining whether the discrimination
is inherently destructive.7 9 First, an act is inherently destructive if it creates among strikers "cleavage that would
endure after they return to work, and by dividing the employees, undermine[s] their ability to act in concert to exercise their [slection 7 rights."80 Secondly, an inherently destructive act "discourages collective bargaining in the sense
it seem a futile exercise in the eyes of the employof making
81
ees."

73. 858 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
74. Id. at 762.
75. Id.
76. Id. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (holding that
granting 20 years of super-seniority to replacement workers and returning
strikers is to be inherently destructive); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347
U.S. 17 (1954) (holding that discharging and suspending employees for soliciting for union membership is inherently destructive); see also Note, LockoutsEmployer's Lockout with Temporary Replacements Is an Unfair Labor Practice,
85 HARv. L. REV. 680, 686 (1972) (noting the "distinction between conduct
which merely influences the outcome of a particular dispute and that which is
potentially disruptive of the opportunity for future employee organization and
concerted activity.").
77. International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. NLRB, 858 F.2d 756, 761-62 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
78. Id. at 762.
79. Id. at 762-64.
80. Id. at 764. For example, in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221,
225 (1963), the Supreme Court found an employer's offer of super-seniority to
those strikers who returned to work to create such a division.
81. Boilermakers, 858 F.2d at 764.
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4. To Which PositionsAre Returning Strikers Entitled?
In Rose PrintingCo.,82 the NLRB expanded upon its previous holding in Laidlaw Corp.8" that "replaced economic
strikers who have made an unconditional application for reinstatement, and who have continued to make known their
availability for employment, are entitled to full reinstatement
to fill positions left by the departure of permanent replacements." 4 Rose Printinginvolved three economic strikers who
made unconditional offers to return to work. 5 While no jobs
were immediately available, approximately nine months
later, the employer hired at least nine individuals to fill general worker positions without offering these jobs to the returning strikers.8 6 While the strikers were qualified for the
positions, they involved lower pay and skill levels than their
previous jobs. 7 In this case, the NLRB addressed the unanswered issue of whether returning strikers are entitled to
any job for which they are qualified, or only substantially
equivalent ones.88
"In striking the balance between employers' rights to
continue business operations and employees' rights to engage
in strikes,"8 the NLRB held that returning strikers are
"entitled to return to those jobs or substantial equivalents if
such positions become vacant, and they are entitled to nondiscriminatory treatment in their applications for other
jobs. '0 In coming to this conclusion, the NLRB was concerned about the burden that would be imposed upon employers if employees were entitled to all available positions.9
82. 304 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1991).
83. 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enfd Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 99
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
84. Id. at 1366 (emphasis added). Prior cases held that returning workers
were only entitled to nondiscriminatory treatment as applicants, as opposed to
being entitled to a position. Id. at 1369. See generally J. Finkin, The Truncation of Laidlaw Rights by Collective Agreements, 3 IND. REL. L.J. 591 (1979).
85. Rose PrintingCo., 304 N.L.R.B. at 1080.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1076.
89. Id. at 1078.
90. Id. at 1084 (emphasis added). The NLRB noted that while employees
are not entitled to nonequivalent jobs, employers are "not free to prefer new
applicants over [returning strikers] simply because they had been on strike."
Rose PrintingCo., 304 N.L.R.B. at 1080.
91. Id. at 1079.
[E]ven though an employer has acted lawfully in replacing a striker,
the employer would be obligated to reinstate the striker to a vacant
nonequivalent job which the striker is qualified to perform. The em-
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Thus, the NLRB found that the employer was not obligated
to rehire the returning strikers to positions that were not
equivalent to their pre-strike positions.92
B. "Salting"
1. The Lechmere Decision
While employees have the right to distribute union lit-

erature on company property during their non-working
time,9" the right of union organizers to do the same has been
severely restricted by the Supreme Court in recent years."
In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,9 an unfair labor practice charge
was filed against an employer who refused to allow nonemployee organizers access onto its property. In clarifying
previous holdings,97 the Court held that so long as other reasonable means of communicating with employees exist, an
employer may prohibit solicitation and distribution by nonemployee organizers anywhere on company property.98 If no
other reasonable means exist, the section 7 rights99 of employees are then balanced with the property rights of the employer.' ° The Court stated that "reasonable access" is to be
ployer would also be required to transfer the striker to a pre-strike job
or to a substantially equivalent one when it became available and to
hire another person to fill the vacancy left by the transferring striker.
In our view, a striker is not entitled to such preferential treatment ....
Id.
92. Id. at 1090.
93. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
Tlime outside working hours, whether before or after work, or during
luncheon or rest periods, is an employee's time to use as he wishes
without unreasonable restraint, although the employee is on company
property. It is therefore not within the province of an employer to
promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation by an employee outside of working hours, although on company property.
Id. at 803 n.10.
94. Id. at 793.
95. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
96. Id. at 531. The union's actions on company property consisted primarily of placing handbills on the windshields of employee's cars. Id. at 529.
97. See also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Central Hardware Co.
v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105
(1956); Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988).
98. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 538 (1992).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
100. Lechmere, Inc., 502 U.S. at 537.
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defined strictly, "applicable 'only where the location of a
plant and the living quarters of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them."' 1°
2. OrganizedLabor's Response to Lechmere
In response to Lechmere, unions increased their use of
the tactic of paying union organizers to seek jobs with nonorganized companies in order to organize their employees
once hired, a technique known as "salting." °2 The primary
issue posed by salting is whether or not paid union organizers constitute "employees" under section 2(3)103 the NLRA.0
As employees, organizers gain the protection of the NLRA. °5
However, if they are not employees, employers could lawfully
refuse to hire or fire them once their true motive was determined as
they would be afforded no protection under the
06
NLRA.
While the NLRB has consistently held that paid union
organizers are employees under the NLRA, °7 appellate courts
split on the issue.' 8 For example, in H.B. Zachry Co. v.
101. Id. at 535 (quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113
(1956)); see also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
102. See generally Stephen M. Crow & Sandra J. Hartman, The Fate of FullTime, Paid Union Organizers As Employees: Another Nail in the Union Coffin?, 44 LAB. L.J. 30 (1993); Jonathan D. Hacker, Note, Are Trojan Horse Union
Organizers "Employees"?: A New Look at Deference to the NLRB's Interpretation of NLRA Section 2(3), 93 MICH. L. REV. 772 (1995); Judd H. Lees, Hiring
the Trojan Horse: The Union Business Agent As a ProtectedApplicant, 42 LAB.
L.J. 814 (1991); Note, OrganizingWorth Its Salt: The Protected Status of Paid
Union Organizers, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1341 (1995).
103. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994).
104. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450 (1995).
105. Id. at 453.
106. Id. "'Employee' [is] a key term in the statue, since ... rights belong
only to those workers who qualify as 'employees' as that term is defined in the
Act." Id.
107. See, e.g., Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224 (1992) (finding paid
union organizers to be "employees" under the act after the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals refused to enforce its similar decision).
108. The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have found paid union organizers not to be "employees" under the NLRA. See H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886
F.2d 70, 72-73 (4th Cir. 1989); NLRB v. Elias Bros. Big Boy, Inc., 327 F.2d 421,
427 (6th Cir. 1964); Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 34 F.3d 625, 628-29
(8th Cir. 1994), rev'd 116 S. Ct. 450 (1995). The Second, Third, and D.C. Circuits have found the opposite, that paid union organizers are "employees" under the NLRA. See NLRB v. Henlopen Mfg. Co., 599 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1979);
Escada (USA) Inc. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 898 (3rd Cir. 1992), enforcing memorandum 304 N.L.R.B. 845 (1995); Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327,
1329-31 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 909 (1993).
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NLRB, "9 the court found no unfair labor practice when an
employer refused to hire a paid professional union organizer." ° The court emphasized that the "plain meaning of the
term 'employee' contemplates an employee working under
the direction of a single employer."'' . Additionally, the court
expressed concern over the "adversariness between employers and unions ' as well as the "divided loyalt[y] ""1 that
would be experienced by an employee with two employers." 4
The holding was specifically limited to job applicants being
paid by another employer, and was not meant to
"encroach... upon the fundamental purpose of the NLRA
[which is] to protect those with union sympathies and allegiances from unfair practices. '
However, in Willmar Electric Service, Inc. v. NLRB," 6
the court reached the opposite conclusion." 7 Unpersuaded by
concerns over having two employers, the court noted that at
common law '[a] person may be the servant of two masters,
not joint employers, at one time as to one act, if the service to
one does not involve abandonment of the service to the
other.""' 8 Thus, only when the employee actually fails (as
opposed to a future possibility) to perform for the non-union
employer in favor of the union employer would the employee
lose the protection of the NLRA."9
In 1995, the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc.,"' resolved the conflict between the federal
courts, finding that paid union organizers are employees under the NLRA."' In Town & Country, the thrust of the employer's argument was that under common law agency principles, the term "employee" could not be interpreted as
109. H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1989).
110. Id. at 72.
111. Id. at 73. "The term plainly does not contemplate someone working for
two different employers at the same time and for the same working hours." Id.
112. Id. at 74.
113. H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 75 (4th Cir. 1989).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
117. Id. at 1329.
118. Id. at 1329-30 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 226
(1958)).
119. Id. at 1330.
120. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450 (1995).
121. Id. at 461.
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including paid union organizers due to the inherent conflict
of interest,'2 2 the same argument that failed in Willmar Electric Service. 2 ' In quickly dismissing this argument, the
Court held that "service to the union for pay does not involve
abandonment of ...service to the company."'24 Specifically,
the organizer is able to perform as a model employee during
working hours while limiting organizing efforts to nonworking hours pursuant to Republic Aviation Corp.'25
Additionally, the employer argued that salting employees may possess a propensity to be disloyal, thus establishing
the inference that Congress could not have intended paid
union organizers to have been included as "employees" under
the NLRA." 6 Unpersuaded by these fears, however, the
Court pointed out the flaws of the argument.'2 7 First, there
was no evidence that the organizers were acting in such a
way that the employer would "lose control over the worker's
normal workplace tasks."'28 Next, acts that harm employers
can be accomplished by any employee, including, for example,
a dissatisfied worker with no union affiliation or an "unpaid
union zealot.""' 9 Lastly, the law affords employers other
remedies "short of excluding paid or unpaid union organizers
from all protection under the Act,""' such as the ability to
fire an employee or notify law enforcement officials of illegal
activity."'
Thus, paid union organizers constitute
"employees" under the NLRA."'
C. PresumptionsPertainingto Strikers and Replacements
After a union receives certification from the NLRB as the
exclusive bargaining agent for an appropriate unit, there is
an irrebuttable presumption that the union possesses major122. Id. at 455.
123. Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
124. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 456.
125. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); see also supra
note 93 and accompanying text.
126. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450, 455 (1995). It was
argued that 'salts' might try to harm the company, perhaps quitting when the
company needs them, perhaps disparaging the company to others, perhaps
even sabotaging the firm or its products." Id. at 456.
127. Id.
128. Id. The Court specifically noted that nothing about the organizers' objectives involved impermissible or unlawful activity. Id.
129. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S.Ct. 450, 456 (1995).
130. Id. at 457.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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ity support by employees for one year.'33 Following the first
year, the presumption becomes rebuttable, thus allowing for
a decertification election, if an employer is able to demonstrate that either: (1) the union does not, in fact, possess
majority support, or (2) the employer has good-faith doubt,
based upon a sufficient objective basis, of the union's majority support.' In NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific Inc.,"'35
the Court determined whether an employer, in establishing
good-faith doubt of a union's support, could presume that
striker replacements opposed the union. 3 '
In holding that an employer may not presume replacement workers to be anti-union,"' the Supreme Court offered
helpful insight into presumptions pertaining to the relationship between striker replacements and striking employees.
First, the Court established that "[p] resumptions normally
arise when proof of one fact renders the existence of another
fact 'so probable that it is sensible and timesaving to assume
the truth of [the inferred] fact ... until the adversary disproves it.""" A presumption that the interests of strikers
and replacements are diametrically opposed could not be established, since replacement workers could feasibly consist of
workers who desired the representation of a union but are
forced to cross the picket line due to economic concerns."'
Additionally, the Court found that a replacement may agree
with unions in general while disagreeing with the purpose of
However, the Court acknowledged that
a particular strike.'
under some circumstances, an anti-union presumption is alSpecifically, the court embraced the NLRB's decilowable.'
133. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 37 (1987).
134. Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. 1339 (1987), enforced, NLRB v. Station
KKHI, 891 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1989).
135. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990).
136. Id. at 777.
137. Id. at 796. "We hold that the Board's refusal to adopt a presumption
that striker replacements oppose the Union is rational and consistent with the
Act." Id.
138. Id. at 788-89 (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343 (E. Cleary ed.,
3d ed. 1984)).
139. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 789 (1990). "In
this sense the replacement worker is not different from a striker who, feeling
the financial heat of the strike on himself and his family, is forced to abandon
the picket line and go back to work." Id.
140. Id. at 775.
141. Id. at 792-93.
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and I T Services,' where strike re-

lated violence and employee anti-union sentiments allowed
for the employer to presume that employees did not support
the union.'
In reaching its conclusion, the Court expressed concern
over an employer's ability to abuse an anti-union presumption.145 Such a rule would enable an employer to more easily
eliminate a union by hiring a sufficient number of replacement employees, thus encouraging the avoidance of goodfaith bargaining.'46 By contrast, the no presumption rule
"[rlestrict[s] an employer's ability to use a strike as a means
of terminating the bargaining relationship,"'47 thus "serv[ing]
the [NLRA's] policies of promoting industrial stability and
negotiated settlements."'48
D. The Diamond Walnut Analysis
Diamond Walnut Growers v. NLRB 4 ' is the result of an
economic strike of 500 permanent and seasonal employees of
Diamond Walnut Growers, Incorporated ("Diamond"), a
Stockton, California-based plant that processes, packages
and ships walnuts to national and international markets." °
The Cannery Workers, Processors, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 601 ("Union") commenced the strike in September
1991, two months after their collective bargaining agreement
with Diamond expired."' After about a year of striking, the
Union lost a representation election held to determine if they
would continue as the employees' exclusive representative."'
However, as a result of objections filed by the Union, a sec142. 268 N.L.R.B. 860, 866-67 (1984).
143. 263 N.L.R.B. 1183, 1185-88 (1982).
144. See Stormor, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. at 866-867; I T Services, 263 N.L.R.B. at
1185-88.
145. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990).
146. Id. at 794.
147. Id. at 794-95.
148. Id. at 795.
149. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut I), 80 F.3d
485 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (per curiam).
150. Id. at 486-87. See generally Workers Reject Union, S.F. CHRON., Sept.
27, 1994, at B2; Mark Arax, Strikers Reap Harvest of Bitterness, L.A. TIMES,
May 10, 1994, at A3; Michael Doyle, White House Accused of Pro-UnionBias,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 17, 1993, at D1.
151. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut I), 80 F.3d
485 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (per curiam).
152. Id.
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ond election was ordered to be held on October 7 and 8,
1993.
On September 20, 1993, the Union, by letter, informed
Diamond that four economic strikers, including Willa Miller,
The next day,
wished to return to work unconditionally.'
the Union notified Diamond that two more strikers, includto work.15
ing Alfonsina Munoz, were also willing to return
Diamond agreed to hire back the striking employees, but only
for seasonal positions since all of the year-round positions
were filled.156 Miller and Munoz accepted the seasonal employment, despite previously holding year-round positions.'57
Citing concerns for employee safety and sabotage, Diamond
made the decision to place the returning workers in "nonsensitive positions, i.e., positions that were well supervised,
not isolated and did not allow them to move around the plant
during work hours,"'58 instead of positions for which they
were qualified."9
After returning to work, the former strikers campaigned
for the Union and monitored the activities of Diamond, reporting their observations to the Union attorney after each
shift.'6 ° After the representations election on October 7 and
8, Miller and Munoz submitted letters of resignation and re-

153. Id.
154. Id. at 487. The letter stated in pertinent part:
Several of the strikers share the Union's conviction that because of
Diamond management's blind determination to break the union.., a
fair election is simply impossible at this point. Nevertheless, because a
rerun election is to be held, these employees feel that it is important
that the replacement workers... have an opportunity to hear from
Union sympathizers, an opportunity denied them last year because few
worked with them or attended the mandatory employee meeting in
which management personnel campaigned. Accordingly, the [four]
strikers listed below have decided to cease their strike-related activities and have authorized me to inform you that effective upon delivery
of this letter, they are available and willing to return to immediate active employment ....
Id.
155. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut I), 80 F.3d
485, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
156. Id. at 489.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 488.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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turned to the picket line.' The Union lost the election, with
475 employees voting for and 575 against the Union." 2
As a result of Diamond's failure to assign Miller and
Munoz to positions for which they were qualified, the Board's
General Counsel 63 filed an unfair labor practice complaint
against Diamond, citing violations of section 8(a)(3) and section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.'6 4 In his decision, the Administra-

tive Law Judge 6 ("ALJ") applied the principle of Rose Printing,"' that "an employer's obligation to reinstate former
economic strikers extends only to vacancies created by the
departure of replacements from the strikers' former jobs and
to vacancies in substantially equivalent jobs, but not to any
other job which a former striker is or may be qualified to perform."'67 The AU found that the seasonal employment accepted by the workers was not substantially equivalent to
their previous permanent employment; thus, Diamond had
no duty to reinstate the strikers.'68 Accordingly, a prima facie case was not established and the ALJ recommended that

161. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut I), 80 F.3d
485, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (per curiam). The identical resignation letters, drafted by the Union
attorney, stated:
This is to inform you that I have decided to resume the strike against
Diamond effective immediately. Working here over the past couple of
weeks has convinced me that conditions have significantly deteriorated
and I must continue the Union's efforts to bring decency and respect to
the long-term workers of Diamond. Henceforth I will not be crossing
the picket lines.
Id.
162. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 36, 37 (1991), enforcement
denied in part, Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut II),
113 F.3d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc).
163. Unions, employers and employees file charges of unfair labor practices
with the General Counsel, who has the authority to investigate charges, to decide whether complaints should be issued and to direct the prosecution of such
complaints. See COX ET AL., supra note 7, at 103.
164. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut I), 80 F.3d
485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)-(3) (1994)), vacated and
reh'g en banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
165. After the General Counsel issues a complaint, a hearing is held before
an Administrative Law Judge who prepares a decision containing proposed
findings of fact and recommendations to the NLRB for the disposition of the
case. See COX ET AL. supra note 7, at 104-05. The NLRB normally adopts the
decision of the Administrative Law Judge if no exceptions are filed. Id.
166. Rose Printing Co., 304 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1991).
167. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 36, 39 (1991), enforcement
denied in part, see Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut
II), 113 F.3d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc).
168. Id.
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the complaint be dismissed.'69
The NLRB disagreed with the ALJ. 7 ' Even though Dia-

mond was under no legal obligation to reinstate the strikers
to jobs that were substantially equivalent, the NLRB found
that "once it voluntarily decided to reinstate them, it was required to act in a nondiscriminatory fashion toward the
In support of its actions, Diamond asserted a
strikers."''
Fleetwood defense,'72 claiming there were legitimate and substantial business justifications for its decision.' 73 Specifically,
Diamond noted previous violence directed at replacement
workers, hostility between strikers and replacement workers
and the potential for damage to its products.' 74 The Board,
while not deciding whether a Fleetwood defense was applicable, held that if it did apply, it would "lack merit." 17' Accord-

ingly, the Board ordered Diamond to reinstate the workers
and "to make them whole for the loss of earnings and benefits that they have suffered as a result of the discrimination
against them.'' 76 77Additionally, a third representation election was ordered.'

Subsequently, Diamond petitioned to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which granted
review of the Board's decision.'7 ' The central issue presented
was whether substantial and legitimate business justificathe returning workers to nontions existed for assigning
9
sensitive positions.'

The court examined the reasoning behind the job placePrior to the strike, Miller
ment of Miller and Munoz.'
Even
worked as a year-round quality control supervisor.'
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 38.
172. See supra Part II.A.2.
173. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 36, 38 (1991), enforcement
denied in part, see Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut
II), 113 F.3d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 38-39.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut I), 80 F.3d
485 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (per curiam).
179. Id. at 486.
180. Id. at 490.
181. Id. at 500 (Wald, J., dissenting).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

though there were seasonal openings for this position when
she crossed the picket line, Miller was appointed to a position
as a packer, where she "stuff[ed] one-pound bags of walnuts
into large boxes"'' and received 32 cents less an hour than
her previous job.' 8' Munoz had worked as a year round lift
truck operator before the strike, and a seasonal position was
available when she returned to work.' Diamond, however,
assigned Munoz to a cracker position, where she "crack[ed]
open 17,000 grams of walnuts per day at a pay rate of
$5/hour,"'85 which was $2.50 to $5.00 an hour less than the
wage of a lift truck operator. 8 '
In support of the conclusion that Diamond established
substantial and legitimate business justifications for its reassignment of Miller and Munoz, the court first noted the
strong relationship between the employees and the Union.'87
Especially significant were both the Union's instructions to
not communicate with the employees, but to instead communicate directly with the Union, and the "omnipresen[ce]" of
the Union lawyer. "8 ' Instead of coming back to work, the
strikers acted as a "union envoy,"'89 seeking "temporary access to the work place, and work force." 9°
The court then presented two general concerns the employer faced in taking back the striking employees."' First,
19
the return of the workers "presented a high risk of unrest."

Early in the strike, violence between strikers and replacement workers existed,' 9' and the resulting tension still ex182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut I), 80 F.3d
485, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald, J., dissenting), vacated and reh'g en banc
granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
185. Id. at 499.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 490. "In short the returning strikers and the Union spoke with
one voice." Id.
188. Id.
189. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut I), 80 F.3d
485, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 491-92.
192. Id. at 491.
193. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. 61, 64-66 (1991), enforcement denied, Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut I), 80
F.3d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam). The documented acts of violence and harassment
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isted when the workers crossed the picket line.' Second, the
court recognized Diamond's fear that "returning strikers
could engage in product tampering, sabotage or otherwise
disrupt the company's operation." 9' Specifically, Miller and
Munoz participated in a tour urging a boycott of Diamond
products where strikers made disparaging comments pertaining to the company's product.'96 If these employees were
allowed to return to sensitive positions, they may be able to
ensure that there charges became true.9

7

In light of these

concerns, the court concluded that Diamond established substantial and legitimate business justifications for its placement of Miller and Munoz.9
In a blistering dissent, Judge Wald strongly opposed the
majority's finding that legitimate and substantial business
justifications existed for the discrimination of Munoz and

include, but are not limited to: rocks thrown at buses used to transport nonstrikers from the parking lot to the plant; a non-striking employee severely
beaten at a grocery store by two to three men who made strike related comments; all four tires of non-striker's vehicle slashed; non-strikers' homes pelted
with broken eggs; and an anonymous phone call to a non-striking employee
stating, "We know where you live and going to get you-won't have to worry
about family if continue to work at Diamond Walnut." Id.
194. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut I), 80 F.3d
485, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (per curiam). Upon learning about the return of the striking employees, a replacement worker wrote a letter to co-workers stating in part:
They have threatened us-Intimidated us-Called us every name in
But... [1]et's not
the book-And even destroyed our property ....
stoop to their level of immaturity. They may still say things that piss
you off; but PLEASE for the sake of all of our futures here at Diamond
Walnut let's keep cool and be level-headed in our everyday dealings
with these people.
Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. Leaflets distributed on the tour accused Diamond of hiring
"unqualified replacements workers who allowed contaminated and inedible
walnuts-with mold, dirt, oil, worms and debris-to be marketed." Id.
197. Id. at 490. In addition to the two general concerns, the court hypothesized specific scenarios that could occur if Miller and Munoz were allowed to
return to their previous jobs. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB
(Diamond Walnut I), 80 F.3d 485, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en
banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam). As a quality controller, Miller was in a position to either cause or allow the distribution of defective
products. Id. As a lift truck driver, Munoz could cause damage by recklessly
driving the 11,000-pound vehicle. Id. Munoz was also in a position to cause
production delay since the lift truck was an essential element of the production
process which operated on a tight time schedule. Id. at 491.
198. Id.
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Miller.'99 According to Judge Wald, the majority "ignore[d]
the impact of analogous contrary decisions involving differential treatment based on disloyalty or misconduct concerns.""'
More specifically, the thrust of the dissent's opinion was the
notion that the court's inference of disloyalty and fears of
violence based on the fact that employees were acting as
agents of the Union was incompatible with the Supreme
Court's decision in Town & Country.2"' Judge Wald noted
that the Supreme Court, in rejecting the notion that paid
union organizers should not be afforded the same protection
under the NLRA as other employees, found "serious problems" with the employer's arguments that were directly applicable to the present issue. °2 Accordingly, the dissent
found no legitimate and substantial business justifications
for the discrimination against Miller and Munoz."°3
The full court of the Ninth Circuit then vacated the
panel's judgment and ordered that the case be reheard en
banc. °4 A divided ten judge panel held that while no reasonable business justifications existed for discriminating against
Munoz,2"' the employer was justified in not allowing Miller to
return to her previous position." 6
In regard to Munoz, the court agreed that a generalized
fear of violence fails to constitute a legitimate concern; instead, a "concrete threat to [the] strikers" must exist." 7 The
court noted that measures should be taken against those who
threaten the violence rather than the potential victims.0 '
Similarly, the court found that fear of sabotage did not rise to
the level of a substantial business justification. 9 Any time a
returning striker returns to work while the strike is ongoing,

199. Id. at 495-501 (Wald, J., dissenting).
200. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut I), 80 F.3d
485, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald, J., dissenting), vacated and reh'g en banc
granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 501.
203. Id.
204. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(per curiam).
205. See Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut II), 113
F.3d 1259, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc).
206. Id. at 1266.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1267.
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there will be some risk of sabotage.210 Citing to Town &
Country, the court noted that if Munoz did engage in forklift
sabotage, the employer would likely find out and disciplinary
action could be taken.2 1'
However, unlike Diamond Walnut I, a majority of the en
banc panel found that Diamond possessed a legitimate and
substantial business justification for discriminating against
Miller. 12 The court determined that if Miller were allowed to
resume her job as a quality control assistant, where final
visual inspection of walnuts is made prior to leaving the
plant, she would have a unique opportunity and little risk of
detection to make the Union's claims of tainted walnuts come
true.21
The court analogized the economic consequences of
tainted walnuts during an economic strike to a nuclear
bomb." 4 In both cases, "the unpleasant effects will long survive the battle. 21 ' Furthermore, because Miller could commit
sabotage with little risk of discovery, the remedies contemplated in Town & Country would be inadequate. 21 6' Therefore,
the combination of a "special motive, a unique opportunity
and little risk of detection to cause severe harm" created an
extraordinary risk, amounting to a legitimate and substantial business justification.2 7
Seven members of the ten judge panel dissented and
concurred in part to the majority decision.218 Three judges
argued that Diamond was justified in discriminating against
both Miller and Munoz.219 According to Judge Henderson,
the placement of workers in a lower paying job is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination as required by Great Dane since it could not have discouraged pro210. Id. at 1266.
211. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut II), 113 F.3d
1259, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc).
212. Id. at 1267.
213. Id. at 1269.
214. Id. at 1267.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1269. "There is no remedy that might lie against Miller that
could compensate Diamond for the type of damage even a moment's lapse on
her part could cause." Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut II), 113 F.3d 1259, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc).
217. Id.
218. See id. at 1270 (Wald, J., concurring and dissenting); see also id. at 1279
(Henderson, J., concurring and dissenting).
219. Id. at 1279.
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tected activity. 2
Furthermore, even if a prima facie case
was established, Diamond's actions were still justified because, as a forklift operator, Munoz possessed access to the
finished product without any supervisors present. 22' Thus,
Munoz was 22just as able to engage in product tampering as
was Miller.1
Four other judges also dissented in part, claiming Diamond was not justified in discriminating against Miller.2 3
Just as the majority required specific evidence to validate
concerns over Munoz, they argued that established labor
policy required Diamond to produce specific evidence to validate the fear of product tampering as well. 224 Furthermore,
the dissenting judges argued that by allowing Diamond to
use the protected activity of product disparagement as
grounds for discrimination, the majority restricted the ability
of employees to utilize public appeals. 2 5

III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The following hypothetical illustrates the potential
problems raised by Diamond Walnut.
In 1995, a union composed predominately of middle class
workers with low skills went on strike in an effort to gain increased wages. Because the jobs required lower skills, it was
possible for the employer to hire permanent replacement
workers to keep the plant in continual operation. After six
months of striking, negotiations between the union and employer were breaking down and an election was to be held in
order to determine if the union would continue as the em220. Id. at 1282. "In determining whether Diamond's placement of the returning strikers could have discouraged protect activity, we must examine
more than differing wages as the majority has done." Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut II), 113 F.3d 1259, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(en banc).
221. Id. at 1284.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1279 (Wald, J., concurring and dissenting).
224. Id. at 1272. See Medite of New Mexico, Inc. v. NLRB, 72 F.3d 780, 790
(10th Cir. 1995) ("an employer's determination not to reinstate a striker must
be based on evidence that the striker personally engaged in strike misconduct"
(quoting Midwest Solvents, Inc. v. NLRB, 696 F.2d 763, 765 (10th Cir. 1982))).
225. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut II), 113 F.3d
1259, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Wald, J., concurring and dissenting). It
was predicted that future employers would exploit this holding by refusing to
place returning employees in product quality positions if the union engaged in
product disparagement. Id. at 1279.
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ployees' representative.
For replacement workers, their experience with unions
to this point had been negative. They were yelled at by union
workers every day they went work, and there were rumors of
harassing phone calls. Some workers who crossed the picket
line described the union as an organization which does
nothing for employees except to take money for dues. In order to inform the replacements of the potential benefits of the
union, some strikers decided to cross the picket line and return to work, hoping that a less adversarial atmosphere
would allow for increased communication.
The employer is not sure of these strikers' motivation for
returning. Although the strikers have not questioned the
quality of the replacement workers' product, the returning
strikers would have the opportunity to commit acts of sabotage if they returned to their previous positions. Furthermore, the employer fears the potential for violence since
some of the replacement workers have strong feelings against
the union and its strikers. Additionally, the employee realizes that if the union loses the election, she will no longer
have an obligation to bargain with them.
This hypothetical demonstrates the unanswered questions left by Diamond Walnut. For example, what evidence
does the employer need to present in order to prove its claim
of a legitimate and substantial business justification? If the
employer does decide to discriminate against the returning
strikers, will it be possible that its actions will be found to be
inherently destructive, thus making its business justification
irrelevant? And when, if ever, can a union activist cross the
picket line in order to inform replacement workers of the
benefits of representation? Currently, Diamond Walnut is
the only case where this new tactic has been reviewed, and,
unfortunately, little to no guidance is offered to future employers, unions, or courts facing this situation.
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Inherently Destructive v. ComparativelySlight
1. The DiscriminatoryEffect of the Employer's Act

One avenue unexplored by the NLRB, Diamond I, and
Diamond If was whether the employer's action constituted
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an inherently destructive act. The NLRB found it unnecessary to make this distinction since no substantial and legitimate business justifications existed for the discriminatory
act; the act constituted an unfair labor practice regardless of
whether it had an inherently destructive or comparatively
slight impact on protected activity.226 The Diamond I court
interpreted the NLRB's absence of a decision as a concession
that the act was classified as having a comparatively slight
impact."7 Subsequently, the Diamond II court found that
this issue was not raised before the Board and, thus, the
court would not consider the argument. 8
A careful reading of the NLRB's decision, however, demonstrates the potential for the act to be classified as inherently destructive. The Diamond's discriminatory act was
found to be serious enough to warrant the setting aside of the
representation election, even though only a small number of
employees were involved out of a bargaining unit that consisted of almost 1300 employees. 29 Consequently, the NLRB
found the conduct to involve "serious violations of section
8(a)(3) in which employees were denied jobs solely because of
their protected strike activity, while at the same time being
placed in positions that were among the lowest paying in the
plant."23 ° Additionally, replacement employees would likely
notice that the employer did not look favorably upon those
who took leading roles on behalf of the Union, thus discouraging future employees from engaging in similar conduct.2 31
2. Does DiscriminatoryJob Placement Have an
226. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 36, 42 (1995), enforcement
denied in part, Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut II),
113 F.3d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc).
227. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc., 80 F.3d at 489. "The Board appears to
concede that Diamond's conduct had at most a comparatively slight adverse effect on protected activity." Id.
228. See Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut II), 113
F.3d 1259, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc). Although the majority decision refused to address the issue, Judge Henderson's dissent actually argued the discrimination did not reach the comparatively slight discrimination standard. Id.
at 1279 (Henderson, J., concurring and dissenting).
229. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 36, 39 (1995), enforcement
denied in part, Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut II),
113 F.3d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc).
230. Id. (referring to 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994)).
231. Id.
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Inherently DestructiveAdverse Effect on an Employee's
ProtectedActivity?

If Diamond's acts had been found to be inherently destructive, an unfair labor practice could be found despite the
existence of legitimate and substantial business justifications.232 Acts found to be inherently destructive generally fall
into one of the following categories: (1) acts that create a
cleavage between employees that would endure after they return to work;2.3 or (2) acts that make employees feel as if collective bargaining is futile.234
Discriminatory job placement of returning strikers does
not create the requisite cleavage between employees. In order for there to be such a division, those strikers who were
discriminated against would need to stand in a worse position after the strike than those who remained on the picket
lines. 235 For example, the offer of super-seniority in NLRB v.
Erie Resistor Corp.236 would have operated as a reward for
those who crossed the picket line and its effects would have
lasted once the strike was over by dividing the employees
into two camps: "[1] those who stayed with the union[;I and
[2] those who returned before the end of the strike and
thereby gained extra seniority."237 In Diamond Walnut, the
discriminatory treatment would presumably end at the conclusion of the strike, thus causing no lasting division between
workers.
By placing replacement workers in well supervised positions, an employer may discourage collective bargaining
among employees. In Diamond Walnut, the company's actions affected Miller and Munoz, employees who were
strongly affiliated with the union. For example, both the
Diamond I and Diamond If courts found it significant that
Miller and Munoz had participated in a tour urging a national boycott of Diamond products, a protected activity under the NLRA. 2" However, it is probable that many striking
232. See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967).
233. See supra Part II.A.3.
234. See supra Part II.A.3.
235. International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. NLRB, 858 F.2d 756, 764 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
236. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
237. Id. (numerals added).
238. See NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953)
(establishing the standard for when an employee's disparaging statements to-
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employees realize the financial burdens created during a
strike and the future possibility of having to return to work
in order to make ends meet. To ensure that they will not be
confused with those returning to promote the union, employees may feel compelled to take less active roles. This could
translate into less participation in protected activities, such
as tours or other methods beyond striking aimed at putting
economic pressure upon the employer. Furthermore, the
bargaining power of the union could be diminished, resulting
in employees being more hesitant to participate in future
strikes. Therefore, Diamond's actions may have been inherently destructive of protected rights.
Yet, this argument is speculative and not entirely supported by the facts of Diamond Walnut. Both Miller and
Munoz returned to work for the specific purpose of speaking
with replacement workers.23 9 Additionally, not only did they
participate in a bus tour, but Miller and Munoz submitted
letters from the Union attorney announcing their purpose. 4 °
They also instructed Diamond to communicate with Union
attorneys instead of themselves.24 Thus, the employer's actions could more accurately be viewed as discriminating
against Union members who cross the picket line at the direction of the union, and whose primary objective is something other than working, rather than viewed as discriminating against Union supporters.
Taking this view, the employees' participation in the bus
tour would become irrelevant since it would not be the basis
for the discrimination. Viewed this way, it is the union that
controls the effects, if any, on collective bargaining; the union
can choose to either have those least active in the Union
cross the picket line or it could direct no one to crossover.
This is not to say that an employer's actions could never
amount to anything more than comparatively slight discrimination or that discrimination never be considered discriminatory. Instead, Diamond's actions did not meet the
higher standard of inherently destructive discrimination, a
classification that is, as the Ninth Circuit points out,
wards an employer's products becomes unprotected activity).
239. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut I), 80 F.3d
485, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
240. See supra note 155.
241. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc., 80 F.3d at 487.
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"relatively rare."242
B. Substantialand Legitimate Business Justifications
In holding that Diamond established substantial and legitimate business justification for Miller, but not for Munoz,24 the Diamond Walnut II court cited to the Supreme
Court's decision in NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc.244
Specifically, in terms of the fear of sabotage, the court found
alternative remedies existed, other than discrimination, for
the action taken towards Munoz, but not for Miller.245
In concluding that Diamond's concerns of sabotage and
violence were valid, the Diamond Walnut I court specifically
rejected the application of the rationale used in Town &
Country. The court limited Town & Country to its specific
holding, that a paid union organizer is an employee under
the NLRA, despite an employer's fear of sabotage.24 The dissent, however, found the rationale in Town & Country to be
directly applicable, justifying a finding that no legitimate and
substantial business justifications existed.247
1. Fearof Sabotage
In refusing to adopt the Town & Country rationale, the
Diamond Walnut I court made the distinction that the risk of
sabotage was raised to argue that paid union organizers were
not meant to be included as "employees" under the NLRA, as
opposed to assert a Fleetwood defense.4 8 Using the rationale
of Town & Country, the Diamond Walnut II court focused on
whether the employer had alternative remedies.249 However,
242. Loomis Courier Serv. v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1979).
243. See Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut II), 113
F.3d 1259, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc).
244. 116 S. Ct. 450 (1995).
245. Id.
246. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut I), 80 F.3d
485, 490 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en bane granted, 88 F.3d 1064
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam). "Judge Wald read far too much into Town &
Country. There the Supreme Court simply confirmed what this Court had previously held... : A paid union organizer can be an 'employee' protected by the
Act." Id.
247. Id. at 498 (Wald, J., dissenting).
248. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut I), 80 F.3d
485, 490 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en bane granted, 88 F.3d 1064
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
249. See Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut II), 113
F.3d 1259, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en bane).
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these applications of the Town & Country rationale are
flawed since the courts fail to recognize the entire sabotage
argument.
The complete argument made by the employer in Town
& Country can be broken down into the following three step
inference: (1) a paid union organizer's loyalty is split between the union and the employer; (2) because of this split,
there is the risk that the organizer may try to harm or sabotage the company; (3) since there is the risk of sabotage, paid
union organizers were not meant to be included as
"employees" under the NLRA.25 ° The Town & Country court,
in rejecting this argument, concluded that the inference from
step one to two, the potential for sabotage, failed from
"several serious problems." 251 First, there was no evidence
to
suggest that the employer would lose control over the union
organizer. 52 Second, just as a union organizer may hurt the
company, so may any one of a number of other categories of
employees. 53 Third, if a union organizer engaged in unwanted activity, the law provides for alternative remedies.25 4
Therefore, because the argument fails at step number two,
step number three in the analysis becomes irrelevant, thus
making the court's distinction in Diamond Walnut I erroneous.
By breaking down Diamond's sabotage argument into
the following similar three step analysis, the appropriateness
of the application of Town & Country becomes increasingly
clear: (1) a union activist who crosses the picket line in support of the union has his or her loyalty split between the union and the employer; (2) because of this split, there is the
risk that the union activist may try to harm or sabotage the
company; (3) since the risk of sabotage exists, there are legitimate and substantial reasons for discriminating against
the employee. 5' The only significant difference between the
Town & Country analysis and the Diamond Walnut analysis
is that in Diamond Walnut, step one involves a crossover
250. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450, 455 (1995).
251. Id. at 456.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 457.
255. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut II) 80 F.3d
485, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
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employee instead of a paid union organizer.256 Therefore, if
the three "serious problems" are as equally applicable to returning strikers as to paid union organizers, fear of sabotage
is not a substantial and legitimate concern.
a. Loss of Control
First, the facts of Diamond Walnut do not suggest that
"acts of disloyalty were present, in kind or degree, to the
point where the company might lose control over the worker's
normal workplace tasks."257 To substantiate Diamond's fear
of sabotage, the court was only able to point to the employee's
participation in a bus tour where leaflets claiming that replacement workers were producing inferior products were
handed out." 8 Once allowed to return to work, it was argued
that former strikers could make the accusations in the leaflets come true.259 However, as the Diamond dissent points
out, both the bus tour and the distribution of negative information constituted protected activity under the NLRA."6 ° It
is completely illogical for a single act of an employee to simultaneously constitute a protected activity under the NLRA
as well as justification for discrimination.
Furthermore, the Diamond Walnut courts failed to recognize the distinction between the general role of a striker
and the role of a union activist who returns to work. While it
is true that strikers generally attempt to put economic pressure on their employers,26 ' this goal ceases to exist when a
crossover employee returns prior to a representation election.
The new purpose, as articulated in the letter presented to
Diamond, was to allow "replacement workers... [to] have an
opportunity to hear from Union sympathizers."2 6 ' It is very
improbable that an employee, in an effort to increase support
for the Union, would attempt to contaminate nuts or damage
the inside of a plant with an 11,000 pound lift truck. Instead, "logic would suggest that a striker returning with the
express intent of wooing replacement workers to support the
256. Although step number three is significantly different, it is irrelevant
once step number two fails.
257. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450, 456 (1995).
258. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc., 80 F.3d at 491.
259. Id. at 492.
260. Id. at 497 (Wald, J., dissenting).
261. See COXETAL., supra note 7, at 468-74.

262. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc., 80 F.3d at 487.
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Union would go out of [their] way to minimize the possibility
of reflecting poorly on the Union."26 3
b. "Argument Proves Too Much"
In classifying union organizers as employees, the Supreme Court found that the sabotage argument "proves too
much,"264 since a myriad of groups could commit the same
type of acts that the employer feared the organizer would
commit.26 In other words, just because certain employees
might attempt to harm the employer does not mean that they
should be afforded fewer rights. The same logic applies to
crossover employees. It is possible, for example, that a
striker who returns for economic reasons would be more
prone to committing acts of sabotage than a union activist.
After all, this type of employee has been forced to return to a
job where conditions were so poor, he or she felt compelled to
strike. This does not mean that an employer can discriminate against employees who are forced to cross the picket line
in order to feed their families.
c. Other Legal Alternatives
Lastly, just as "the law offers alternative remedies for
[an employer's] concerns [of sabotage], short of excluding
paid or unpaid union organizers from all protection under the
' there
Act,"266
are remedies short of discrimination in regard
to job placement. For example, if an employer is concerned
that the returning striker will return to the picket line immediately after the representation election, the employer can
"offer its employees fixed-term contracts, rather than hiring
them 'at will."'267 Furthermore, if the employee does engage
in any form of inappropriate activity, the employer can then
take appropriate disciplinary actions, including termination.268 Therefore, because the rationale of Town & Country
applies in the context of Diamond Walnut, and each of the
serious problems articulated in Town & Country were present, fear of sabotage should not constitute a substantial and

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 498 (Wald, J., dissenting).
NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450, 456 (1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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legitimate business concern under Fleetwood.
2. Fearof Violence
a. Relevance of Town & Country
The second justification put forth by Diamond for establishing substantial and legitimate business justifications for
its discriminatory actions was the potential of unrest and
violence.269 Strike related violence, threats, and vandalism
occurred early on in the strike and replacement workers continued to harbor resentment. 27 0 As with fears of sabotage, the

dissent of Diamond I appeared to apply the Town & Country
analysis. 71 The appropriateness of a Town & Country application and analysis, however, is not as clear in the violence
context.
To determine the appropriateness of the Town & Country analysis, it is helpful to return to the three step analysis
of the argument disapproved of in Town & Country: (1) an
employee who crosses the picket line in support of the union
has his or her loyalty split between the union and the employer; (2) because of this split, there exists the risk that the
organizer may try to harm or sabotage the company; and (3)
since the risk of sabotage exists, there are legitimate and
substantial reasons for discriminating against the employee. 72 If, as with the risk of sabotage, the fear of violence
breaks down into a similar analysis, a Town & Country application would be appropriate.
However, an employer's fear of violence between crossover employees and replacement workers cannot be broken
down into a comparable three step analysis. The distinguishing factor preventing such an application is the origin of
the employer's fear of violence. Step 1 demonstrates that in
the sabotage context, the origin of the employer's fear is the
split of loyalty experienced by paid union organizers (as well
269. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut I), 80 F.3d
485, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en banc granted,88 F.3d 1064 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 499 (Wald, J., dissenting). It "appears" that the dissent applied a
Town & Country analysis since Judge Wald specifically addressed alternative
legal remedies to potential violence. Id. However, the other Town & Country
elements were not addressed. See generally id.
272. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450, 458 (1995).
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as strikers who cross the picket line to support the union),
allowing for the inference of the potential disloyalty found in
step 2. By contrast, the fear of violence does not stem from a
dual allegiance, but instead results from the potential for
conflict during a strike between replacement workers and
strikers. Thus, it becomes apparent that the rationale used
in Town & Country is not applicable to the fear of violence.
b. Relevance of Curtin Matheson Scientific
While Town & Country is not relevant to the fear of violence analysis, the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v.
Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.27 offers some helpful insight.
In Curtin Matheson, the Court decided whether or not an
employer may presume that replacement workers oppose the
union."' This is directly relevant to the Diamond Walnut
analysis, where the issue presented was whether an employer may presume that replacement workers would oppose
crossover strikers who support the union to such an extent
that violence was a likely outcome. 75
In order to fully understand the relevance of Curtin
Matheson, it is helpful to break down the employer's arguments into the following inferential steps: (1) the interests of
the union strikers and permanent replacements are diametrically opposed; and (2) because they are opposed, it is appropriate to assume that replacement workers do not wish to be
represented by the union.276 In support of the proposition
found in step 1, the employer in Curtin Matheson asserted
that since the union usually demands that replacements be
discharged so that strikers can be rehired, the interests of
replacement workers directly conflict with those of the union
strikers.2 " However, in striking down this argument, the
court presented several factors invalidating the employer's
presumption.278 First, some replacement workers may support unions and desire their benefits, but seek employment

273. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990).
274. See discussion supra Part II.C.
275. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut I), 80 F.3d
485, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
276. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 789 (1990).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 789-92.
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as a result of their current economic position.2 79 Next, a union may not possess the needed bargaining power to force an
employer to discharge the replacement workers.28 ° Thus,
"many if not all of the replacements justifiably may not fear
2 1 Addithat they will lose their jobs at the end of the strike.""
tionally, these strikers may even desire union representation
after the strike in order to process grievances and monitor
the employer's actions.2"2
The logic of the Supreme Court supports the general
proposition that an employer may presume that violence will
likely result from the interaction of replacement workers and
strikers prior to a representation election. In order to demonstrate this, it will be helpful to break down this argument
into the following chain of inferences: (1) the interests of
strikers and replacements are diametrically opposed; and (2)
therefore, if an employer allows union activists to return to
work to promote the union, violence may erupt. This assumption of conflict in step 2 is based on the presumption of
step 1, that the replacement workers and strikers are opThis assumption, for the reasons articulated in
posed.
Curtin Matheson, cannot be made by an employer.2 8 Thus,
the general proposition that an employer may presume a
likelihood of violence fails to be a legitimate and substantial
business justification.
In Diamond Walnut, however, the employer did not
make a blind assumption of violence.284 Instead, Diamond
was able to demonstrate that when the strikers returned to
work, they were resented by the replacement workers, presumably because of earlier strike-related violence.285 For example, Diamond's Director of Human Resources testified that
upon learning of the return of the strikers, replacement
workers were heard to make comments such as "[Glee, what
happened if they fell down in the rest room or in the locker

279. Id. at 789.
280. Id. at 790.
281. Id.
282. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 790 (1990).
283. Id. at 789-92.
284. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut I), 80 F.3d
485, 491-94 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
285. Id. at 491.
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room" 286 and "Boy, I bet you won't send them back to bulk
'
storage."287
Additionally, a replacement worker sent a letter
to co-workers in an effort to urge calmness,28 8 arguably because of the disruption the replacement workers caused.
Therefore, the issue became whether an employer's presumption of violence can be valid in light of specific evidence of resentment.
In Curtin Matheson, the Court addressed the relevancy
of picket line violence and statements by replacement workers by embracing the rationale of two specific NLRB decisions."' First, in I T Services,'" the strikers subjected replacement workers to a wide variety of threats and
intimidation on almost a daily basis,29 ' including throwing
beer bottles and rocks at employees and management as well
as slashing car tires."' Furthermore, strike replacements
stated that they did not wish the Union to represent them.292
Second, in Stormor, Inc., 94 a similar situation existed. 9 ' Replacement workers expressed their desire not to join the union and the strike was plagued with violence, including
physical assaults and death threats. 96 In both cases, the
NLRB found these acts to substantiate the employer's good
faith belief that the replacement workers did not support the
union."'
In terms of the two step analysis of Curtin Matheson articulated above,298 these cases stand for the proposition that
the assumption of step 2, that replacement workers do not
wish to be represented by the union, can be reached so long
as the employer produces objective evidence establishing a
"good-faith" belief. This logically implies that only if Diamond can produce objective evidence of the potential for vio-

286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See supra note 195.
289. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 793 (1990).
290. 263 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1982).
291. Id. at 1187-88.
292. Id. at 1185.
293. Id. at 1186.
294. 268 N.L.R.B. 860 (1984).
295. Id. at 861-63.
296. Id.
297. See Stormor, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. at 872; I T Services, 263 N.L.R.B. at
1191 (1982).
298. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
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lence, thus establishing a good-faith belief, would legitimate
and substantial business justifications exist.
Like Stormor and I T Services, the facts of Diamond
Walnut support the inference that the employer possessed a
good-faith belief of potential violence based on objective evidence.299 The beginning of the strike involved continual unrest, including death threats, physical assaults, verbal attacks, and vandalism of property including residences."'
Replacement workers became angry when the union activists
returned, prompting a letter urging workers to remain
calm.3 ' The letter is especially significant since it was written by a replacement worker who was presumably in a position to accurately determine the sentiments of co-workers."0 2
Although the dissent in Diamond I felt that these isolated comments were inadequate to justify discriminatory
treatment, especially since neither Miller nor Munoz were
shown to be involved in the violence,0 3 it must be recognized
that an employer cannot poll replacement workers to determine how many of them may physically assault or otherwise
attempt to harm returning workers. Instead, the employer is
forced to make a good-faith determination of the workplace
environment based on adequate circumstantial evidence,
which is exactly what Diamond did.
V. PROPOSAL
A. The Need for a ConsistentApproach
As unions attempt to utilize innovative organizing techniques, the NLRB and federal courts will face the challenge
of resolving the legal consequences of these innovations.
What must be avoided are ad hoc decisions that only resolve
the fact specific issue presented. While it is impossible to develop an approach for every new tactic, courts should, at a
minimum, follow some guiding principles.
Currently, no approach distinguishes between the
299. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB (Diamond Walnut I), 80 F.3d
485, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
300. See supra note 194.
301. See supra note 194.
302. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc., 80 F.3d at 491, vacated and reh'g en
banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
303. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc., 80 F.3d at 497 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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treatment of returning strikers who return for economic concerns and a union activist who desires to speak with replacement workers. Realistically, attempting to draw such a
distinction is extremely difficult, if not impossible, especially
where an employee returns for several legitimate reasons.
However, employers are more likely to see increasing numbers of returning strikers attempting to educate replacement
workers prior to a representation election. 4 Some employers
will have legitimate concerns regarding the return of the
workers, while others will want to inhibit this type of behavior in hopes that the union will lose the representation election.
In order to maintain a consistent approach to labor law,
the relevant rationales of Supreme Court decisions in prior
labor law cases should be borrowed. For example, when an
employer's discriminatory action towards returning strikers
is based on fears of sabotage, courts should recognize and apply the logic of the unanimous Town & Country decision.
Second, the employee's right to be free from discriminatory
treatment must be balanced against an employer's legitimate
concern of workplace violence. This can best be accomplished
by allowing employers to place returning strikers in well supervised positions only when the employer has a good-faith
belief that violence is probable. In establishing a good-faith
belief, the employer cannot rely on general tensions between
strikers and replacements, but must instead point to objective factors such as strike related violence and the specific
sentiment of replacement workers. By adopting the Supreme
Court's rationale, guiding principles will be offered to future
courts, employers and unions.
B. The Use of Salting in the Strike Context
By having crossovers speak with replacements, unions
may be able to persuade enough voters to allow for continued
representation. However, in order to ensure maximum effectiveness, future unions must improve on the tactics used by
the union in Diamond Walnut. This can be accomplished by
following the tactic of salting more accurately. For example,
when a paid union organizer attempts to be hired by an employer, he or she does not present the employer with a letter

304. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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from the union stating the purpose of the application. Instead, the organizer is presented as a legitimate job applicant, indistinguishable from other applicants.
This same process should be utilized by union activists.
If union activists do not state their purpose, it will be practically impossible for an employer or replacement worker to
distinguish between those returning for economic reasons
and those returning to promote the union. Therefore, if the
employer were to attempt to make such a distinction, it
would most likely be based on the employer's knowledge of
the employee's strong union ties. Thus, any discrimination
against the crossovers would be based strictly upon the degree of union membership and not on the fact that the employee was returning for a purpose other than work. As previously discussed, it is very likely that this type of
discrimination could be found to be inherently destructive,
thus allowing for a finding of an unfair labor practice, even
where business justifications exist."°'
VI. CONCLUSION

The Diamond Walnut court failed to follow basic guiding
principals when it did not recognize the applicability of Town
& Country as well as Curtin Matheson. Just as fears of sabotage do not cause a paid union organizer to no longer qualify
as an "employee" under the NLRA, fears of sabotage do not
justify an employer's discriminatory acts." 6 Furthermore, if
employers are to make presumptions pertaining to strikers
and replacement workers, they must establish a good faith
belief in order for those presumptions to qualify as a reasonable and legitimate business justification." 7 By making an
ad hoc determination of the case, the court in Diamond Walnut failed to recognize settled guidelines of labor law established by the Supreme Court-a mistake that future courts
hopefully will avoid.
Rodney B. Sorensen

305. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
306. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
307. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.

